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MAYO V. PROMETHEUS: REORGANIZING THE TOOLBOX FOR 
PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER AND USES OF NATURAL 
LAWS 
Bryan Wisecup∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Advances in medical technology, in particular the development of 
new and improved medical methods, pose a unique problem for the 
United States patent system, in that some of these inventions exist at the 
fringe of patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  As a 
threshold requirement before consideration of utility, novelty, or non-
obviousness, patent eligible subject matter requires that a new invention 
be of such a nature as to fall within an inventive category enumerated in 
the statute.1  In revising the patent system in 1952, Congress intended 
for the subject matter eligibility requirement to be broad, encompassing 
“any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter . . . .”2  Despite this broad intent, federal courts have long 
recognized an exception to patent eligible subject matter for attempts to 
patent laws of nature.3  Since most inventions rely to some extent upon a 
law of nature, the question arises concerning in just what manner such 
inventions are permitted to rely on or incorporate these laws of nature.4 
For the vast majority of patent applications, the subject matter of the 
invention fits snugly into one of the enumerated categories in § 101, and 
the demarcation of patent eligible subject matter need not be resolved 
with any definiteness.  However, over the past forty years, technological 
advances in computer technology, software, medical treatment methods, 
and genetics have resulted in questions about where the boundary lies 
between a patentable and un-patentable use of a law of nature.5  As 
 
 ∗ Associate Member, 2012–13 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); see also In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (describing 
patent eligible subject matter as the first door through which an inventor must pass before matters of 
novelty and obviousness are even considered). 
 2. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 477 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). 
 3. E.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (“He who 
discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law 
recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the 
law of nature to a new and useful end.”). 
 4. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (“Our earlier opinions lend support to our 
present conclusion that a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become 
nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital computer.”). 
 5. Id. at 175–88 (discussing the challenges with computer technology and software); Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (addressing medical methods); 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (analyzing the 
1
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inventions come closer to this boundary between the broad statutory 
definition of patent eligible subject matter and the judicial exception for 
laws of nature, the distinction between permissible and impermissible 
use of a natural law is not easily discernable. 
This lack of clarity over the boundary of patent eligible subject matter 
for laws of nature has broad implications for the rate of innovation in the 
United States.  The rate of technological innovation has increased 
dramatically over the past thirty years, greatly improving the efficiency 
of gathering and collecting data about the physical world and opening 
up new fields of research.  These new fields present new challenges to 
the patent system, in particular the concept of patent eligible subject 
matter.  Genetics research presents the question of whether specific gene 
sequences, though naturally occurring, can be isolated and patented;6 
computer and data technology pose the question of whether data 
conversion operations and methods satisfy the requirements for eligible 
subject matter;7 and medical methods research challenges the scope of 
patent eligible subject matter.8 
Future developments in the legal standard for patent eligible subject 
matter will likely have a substantial impact on the medical research 
field, especially with respect to medical methods research.  Health care 
spending represents more than 17% of the gross domestic product of the 
United States and continues to increase, and U.S. companies spend 
billions of dollars on medical research to capitalize on this market.9  
From 2007 through 2011, the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO) granted 30,035 patents in the technology class for 
pharmaceuticals and associated methods.10  This total was the most of 
any technology class examined by the PTO and represents over 3% of 
the total number of patents granted.11 
With medical methods in particular, many commentators theorize that 
 
subject matter eligibility in the field of genetics). 
 6. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1303. 
 7. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 175. 
 8. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1289. 
 9. Alex Wayne, Health-Care Spending to Reach 20% of U.S. Economy by 2021, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS, June 13, 2012 (reporting that spending on health care services rose 3.9% in 2011 to about 17.9% 
of the U.S. GDP); $95 Billion a Year Spent on Medical Research, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 20, 2005 
(“Total U.S. spending on medical research has doubled in the past decade to nearly $95 billion a year” 
in 2005). 
 10. Patenting by Geographic Region, Breakout by Technology Class, USPTO (Mar. 27, 2012), 
http://www.uspto.gov (From the “Patent” menu select “Statistics,” select “General Patent Statistics,” 
and under patents select “Calendar Year Patent Statistics.”  From the table of contents, select “By 
Patented Technology” and then scroll down to the report named “clsstc/stc_cl_gd.”  Open reports by 
clicking on the hyperlink.  Click on “all countries”) (Technology class 424, “Drug, Bio-Affecting and 
Body Treating Compositions,” also included technology class 514, which is the technology class of the 
patent at issue in Mayo). 
 11. Id.  
2
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a change in jurisprudence concerning patent eligible subject matter 
could have a drastic effect on future funding of medical research, if the 
change results in precluding an entire class of medical method claims 
from eligibility for patent protection.  Even without a clear definition of 
what is patentable, the uncertainty makes it difficult for researchers to 
predict the value of certain types of research and estimate the possible 
return on the investment of research funds. 
For the past thirty years, federal courts have tried a number of 
approaches to determine the eligibility of subject matter, but have not 
adequately defined the judicial exception to eligible subject matter for 
laws of nature.  In the latest attempt in Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Labs, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a 
medical methods patent on the grounds that it was an attempt to patent a 
law of nature.12  The Court attempted to illuminate a clear standard for 
determining the boundary of the judicial exception to patent eligible 
subject matter for laws of nature, but its efforts have fallen short.  The 
Court only deepened the confusion by covering the issue of patent 
eligible subject matter with a patchwork quilt of past jurisprudence that 
adds very little to clarify the boundary of the appropriate use of a natural 
law in an invention. 
This article seeks to evaluate the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo, 
to consider the decision’s impact on future patent infringement cases, 
and to suggest alternative pathways to clarify the issue of patent eligible 
subject matter for medical methods.  Part II provides an overview of the 
statutory subject matter requirement for patent eligibility and the 
development of the judicial exception for natural laws, abstract ideas, 
and natural phenomenon.  Part III parses through the Court’s decision in 
Mayo and examines the reaction to Mayo in the lower courts and among 
industry participants.  Part IV critiques the Court’s analysis in Mayo, 
proposes an alternative to the inventive concept method for evaluating 
subject matter eligibility, and suggests that Congress take action to 
examine the complex policy considerations surrounding eligible subject 
matter for medical methods and, if necessary, take action to clarify the 
standard. 
II. PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
JUDICIAL EXCEPTION FOR NATURAL LAWS 
Introduction to patent eligible subject matter begins with the 
Constitutional mandate to promote progress.  Article I, Section 8, Clause 
8 of the United States Constitution grants to Congress the power “[t]o 
 
 12. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1305. 
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promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”13  In pursuit of this mandate, the first 
Congress of the United States established the patent system under the 
direction of Thomas Jefferson, the first Secretary of State.14  As 
expressly stated in the “Progress Clause,” the purpose of the patent 
system is to promote progress in the useful arts.15  The intended result is 
to strengthen the economy by facilitating the introduction of new 
products into the market, which advances manufacturing and creates 
jobs.16  
The patent system accomplishes this by conferring patent rights to an 
inventor in exchange for a complete disclosure of the invention.  The 
patent rights granted to the inventor are negative property rights, 
meaning that the inventor is granted the right to exclude others from 
practicing the invention, but the inventor does not possess an unbounded 
right to use or practice the invention.17  Therefore, a patent grants an 
inventor a right to exclude others from practicing the invention.18  
Representing a critical element of the patent, the claims of the patent 
distinctly define the boundaries of the inventor’s exclusive rights.19 
To be eligible for patent protection, the invention must meet the 
statutory requirements for patentability.  Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, 
“[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.”20  This section sets forth the 
first two patentability requirements.  First, the invention must be useful, 
and second, the invention must be a process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter.21  The last phrase of the statute, “subject to the 
 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 14. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 16. Kewanee v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (“The productive effort thereby fostered will 
have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture 
into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our 
citizens.”). 
 17. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006) (“Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee, his heirs or 
assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention 
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States, and, if the invention is a 
process, of the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United 
States, or importing into the United States, products made by that process . . . .”); see also Kewanee, 416 
U.S. at 480. 
 18. Id. 
 19. JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 65 (Aspen Publishing, 3d ed. 2009) (describing the 
function of patent claims). 
 20. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 21. Id. 
4
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conditions and requirements of this title,” refers to the additional 
patentability requirements of novelty, obviousness, and adequacy of 
disclosure.22  The patent eligible subject matter requirement is a 
threshold requirement that must be determined before moving on to the 
novelty and non-obviousness requirements.23   
The discussion of patent eligible subject matter begins in § 101 with 
the requirement that the invention be a “process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter.”24  Analyzing the statutory construction of 
§ 101, the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress intended for § 101 to 
have a wide scope, because of the expansive language used in drafting 
the statute.25  In addition, Congressional reports preceding passage of 
the 1952 Patent Act indicated a desire to “include anything under the 
sun that is made by man.”26 
Although Congress intended for § 101 to be broad, courts have long 
recognized a judicial exception to patent eligible subject matter for laws 
of nature, physical phenomenon, abstract ideas, unapplied mathematical 
algorithms, and products of nature.27  This exception is based on the 
idea that certain information is a manifestation of nature and should be 
free to all persons.28  The demarcation of what is and what is not such a 
manifestation of nature is more difficult to determine, and the courts 
have repeatedly attempted to define this boundary.  The motivation 
behind the exception is to make sure that patents do not preclude the use 
of natural laws in further innovation.29  Though patent protection is 
intended to motivate innovation by providing a financial incentive for 
 
 22. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (novelty requirement); 35 U.S.C. § 103 
(2006) (non-obviousness requirement); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (sufficiency of disclosure requirements). 
 23. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (“The obligation to determine what type of 
discovery is sought to be patented must precede the determination of whether that discovery is, in fact, 
new or obvious.”). 
 24. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 25. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 477 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). 
 26. S. REP. NO. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 
at 6 (1952). 
 27. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112–20 (1854) (holding claim 8 of the Morse Patent to be un-
patentable subject matter as an attempt to patent the use of electromagnetism to transmit characters over 
a distance; discussing Nielson v. Hartford, a case from the English Court of Exchequer that first 
discussed the issue of patentable subject matter in relation to a patent granted for the first blast furnace); 
LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1853) (laws of nature are not eligible for patent protection); Funk 
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1948) (discoveries of natural phenomena 
are not eligible for patent protection); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229–30 (2010) (abstract ideas 
are not patent eligible subject matter); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67–72 (1972) (applying the 
judicial exception to unapplied mathematical algorithms); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 
(1980) (discussing the judicial exception to patent eligible subject matter for products of nature). 
 28. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130. 
 29. See Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67 (“Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental 
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific 
and technological work.”). 
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research and development, claims that are too broad, such that they 
foreclose the tools of science from use by others, can have a negative 
effect on innovation.30 
Although the judicial exception for laws of nature seems 
straightforward, the Supreme Court has struggled to develop a workable 
standard that provides adequate notice to inventors.31  The Court has 
favored two approaches to deciding the question of patent eligible 
subject matter.  First, the Court has employed an “inventive concept” 
analysis, wherein the Court examines the patent claims to determine if 
they include an inventive concept beyond the expression of the natural 
law.32  In response to an attempt to patent a mathematical algorithm, the 
Court stated, “[i]f there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must 
come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful 
end.”33  In essence, the “inventive concept” approach looks to see if the 
claimed invention is a practical application of the law of nature.  
Concerned that a skilled claim draftsperson could circumvent the patent 
eligible subject matter requirement through the crafty choice of 
language, the Court enhanced the standard by requiring more than 
adding insubstantial post-solution activity to a natural law in order to 
make the claim patentable subject matter.34  Stated another way, adding 
insignificant steps to the natural law is not enough to make it patentable.  
In addition, the Court has also held that confining the applicability of a 
natural law to a narrow and specific field of endeavor is also insufficient 
to make the claim to a natural law patentable subject matter.35 
Second, the Supreme Court and lower courts have looked to the 
“machine or transformation test” to decide the patent eligibility of 
process patent claims.36  Under the machine or transformation test, a 
process is patent eligible subject matter only “if: (1) it is tied to a 
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article 
 
 30. See id. at 71–72. 
 31. From now on, the article will refer to the judicial exception for natural laws and will leave 
off abstract ideas, mathematical algorithms and natural phenomenon for the sake of efficiency. 
 32. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (holding the patent for recalculating an alarm limit 
invalid because the claims included no other inventive concept other than using an algorithm to 
calculate a new alarm limit and then storing that alarm limit in computer memory). 
 33. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67. 
 34. Flook, 437 U.S. at 590–91 (outlining the principle that post-solution activity must establish 
some additional inventive concept in order to transform a law of nature/mathematical algorithm into 
patent eligible subject matter).   
 35. See id. at 592–96. 
 36. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 70–71 (discussing prior precedents favoring the machine or 
transformation test but declining to make it the exclusive test for patent eligibility for process claims); 
see also Bilski v. Kappos, 545 F.3d 945, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) [hereinafter Bilski I] (claiming the 
machine or transformation test to be the exclusive test for patent eligible subject matter for process 
claims), overruled by, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) [hereinafter Bilski II]. 
6
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into a different state or thing.”37  In other words, a process claim based 
on a law of nature would not preempt the use of that law of nature if the 
process was confined to the use of a particular machine or transformed 
materials in a particular way.38  Prior to Bilski II, decided in 2010, the 
Federal Circuit favored the machine or transformation test for determine 
patent eligibility for process patents, but in Bilski II, the Supreme Court 
held that the machine or transformation test was only one consideration 
and not the exclusive test to determine the patent eligible subject matter 
for process claims.39 
While these are the two primary methods used by the Court to 
determine patent eligible subject matter under § 101, other methods 
have also been used.  One method suggested in Flook was to treat a law 
of nature as an invention already existing, and therefore not novel, and 
then seeing if anything else was left that was patentable.40  Functionally, 
this method is similar to the “inventive concept” method.  Another 
consideration is the extent to which the claims involving the natural law 
preempt future use of the natural law.41  None of these approaches have 
been adequate to resolve the confusion and doubt surrounding the 
question of patent eligible subject matter for inventions that make use of 
laws of nature. 
The Supreme Court has not been the only entity responsible for 
making changes to the scope of patent eligible subject matter.  In the 
past, Congress has clarified and changed the scope of patent eligible 
subject matter by passing legislation to alter patent eligibility for certain 
types of technology.  To promote innovation in plant breeding, Congress 
enacted the Plant Patent Act in 1930 to extend patent eligibility to 
asexually reproduced plants, which had formerly been considered by 
courts to be unpatentable as products of nature.42  Congress also added a 
separate patent provision for design patents to cover new ornamental 
designs for articles of manufacture.43  As part of the America Invents 
Act of 2011, Congress enacted a provision declaring that “no patent may 
issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism,” 
thereby removing human organisms from patent eligible subject 
matter.44  In the past, Congress has intervened to define patent eligible 
 
 37. Bilski I, 545 F.3d at 954. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Bilski II, 130 S. Ct. at 3227. 
 40. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–92 (1978). 
 41. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71–72 (stating that upholding the claims to the mathematical 
algorithm would pre-empt the use of that algorithm in any use). 
 42. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2006); JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 288 (Aspen Publishing, 3d ed. 
2009). 
 43. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006). 
 44. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33, 125 Stat. 284, 340 (enacted 
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subject matter in certain fields of endeavor.  Congress has not addressed 
the patent eligible subject matter issue for medical methods or computer 
software applications, and because of this, the Court continues to 
struggle, as shown by its extensive discourse in Mayo. 
III. MAYO COLLABORATIVE SERVICES V. PROMETHEUS LABS, INC. 
For over thirty years, the Court has employed a variety of 
considerations in determining whether process claims based on natural 
laws or abstract ideas are patent eligible subject matter.  With this 
kaleidoscope backdrop of methods, the Court approached Mayo 
intending to set forth a clear standard for determining statutory subject 
matter eligibility for processes involving natural laws.  This Casenote 
looks first at the Court’s decision in Mayo and its attempt to clarify the 
issue of patent eligible subject matter and then examines the response in 
the lower courts in cases that have arisen since Mayo. 
A. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Mayo 
Mayo involved an action against Mayo Collaborative Services for 
infringement of two patents covering methods of administering 
thiopurine drugs for the treatment of immune-mediated gastrointestinal 
disorders.45  In March of 2002, the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) issued the 6,355,623 (‘623) Patent for a “[m]ethod of 
treating IBD/Crohn’s disease and related conditions wherein drug 
metabolite levels in host blood cells determine subsequent dosage.”46  
Almost two years later, the USPTO granted a second patent, the 
6,680,302 (‘302) Patent, to the same entity for a similar method for 
optimizing the effectiveness of drug doses in treating immune-mediated 
gastrointestinal disorders.47   
The claims represented in the ‘623 Patent follow a standard format 
and include an administration step, in which the thiopurine drug is 
administered to a patient, and a determination step, in which the blood 
concentrations of the metabolites arising from administration of the drug 
are measured.  The third step is a wherein step, in which the result of the 
determination step is compared to an experimentally determined 
correlation between the concentration of the metabolites and the 
effective dosage of the administered drug.  Below a certain 
concentration, the results suggest that the dosage may be ineffective, and 
 
Sept. 16, 2011). 
 45. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1295–96 (2012). 
 46. U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 (filed Apr. 8, 1999). 
 47. U.S. Patent No. 6,680,302 (filed Dec. 27, 2001). 
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above a higher concentration, the results suggest that the dosage may 
result in harmful side effects.48 
Prometheus Labs became the exclusive license holder of both the 
‘623 and ‘302 Patents and marketed and sold the medical method 
described therein to Mayo Collaborative Services and Mayo Rochester, 
who used the diagnostic method to treat patients.49  After several years 
of purchasing the diagnostic test from Prometheus, Mayo planned to 
develop and sell its own medical method for determining the 
effectiveness of dosing levels for administering thiopurine drugs to treat 
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorders.50  The only substantial 
difference in the Mayo test was a slightly higher threshold metabolite 
concentration for the toxicity limit.51  As the sole exclusive license 
holder, Prometheus Labs brought a claim for infringement of the ‘623 
and ‘302 Patents.52 
The procedural posture of Mayo demonstrates the confusion and 
differences of opinion regarding the treatment of patent eligible subject 
matter for medical methods.  The district court found infringement 
because the difference in the two tests was not significant, but declared 
the patent invalid because the patent was an attempt to patent a law of 
nature.  In so holding, the district court applied an analysis similar to 
Morse and Gottshalk, in which the attempt to patent a law of nature was 
held invalid for precluding use of the natural law for future innovation.  
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s finding of 
invalidity.  The Federal Circuit employed the machine or transformation 
test and found that the administration of the drug to the patient caused a 
transformation to the patient and that measurement of the concentration 
of metabolites in the blood effected a transformation of the sample of 
blood, which the court viewed as a tangible article.53  Upon granting a 
writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court summarily vacated the Federal 
Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bilski II, which held that the machine or 
transformation test was a consideration in determining eligible subject 
matter but was not the only consideration.54  On remand, the Federal 
 
 48. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1295.  See also Nathan A. Reed, Note, A New Metric To Determine 
Patent Eligible Subject Matter for Medical Methods, 16 MICH. ST. J. MED. & LAW 321, 332–36 (2012) 
(describing in detail the treatment of autoimmune diseases with thiopurine drugs and the operation of 
the medical method in patent number ‘623). 
 49. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1295–96. 
 50. Id. at 1296. 
 51. For the metabolite 6-TG, the toxicity limit in the Prometheus patent method was 400 pmol 
per 8x108.  The Mayo test had an upper toxicity limit for 6-TG of 450 pmol per 8x108.  Id.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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Circuit affirmed its prior decision, finding its analysis under the machine 
or transformation test to be compelling despite its consideration of Bilski 
II.55  The case returned to the Supreme Court on another grant of 
certiorari.56  In a unanimous decision, the Court again reversed the 
Federal Circuit decision and held the patent claims to be invalid as an 
attempt to effectively claim a patent on a law of nature.57   
The Supreme Court began its substantive opinion with a declaration 
that the claims of the ‘623 and ‘302 Patents included laws of nature, 
namely the relationship between the level of metabolites in the patient’s 
blood and the effectiveness of the drug.58  The Court stated that the 
correlation is a law of nature because the “relation itself exists in 
principle apart from any human action,” even though resulting from the 
initial action of injecting the drug.59  The Court determined that the 
correlation in the wherein step in the ‘623 Patent claims was a law of 
nature, because the relationship between the concentration of 
metabolites and the effectiveness of the drug existed with no further 
human interaction beyond the initial injection of the drug.60  Since the 
correlation was a law of nature, the question before the Court became 
whether or not the claims of the patent did more than just describe the 
law of nature.61 
To answer this question, the Court engaged in three separate 
approaches to demonstrate that the claims did no more than describe the 
law of nature and, as such, were not patent eligible subject matter: (1) a 
step-by-step inventive concept analysis; (2) a guidepost analysis based 
on prior precedents; and (3) a determination of scope and preemptive 
effect of that scope.62  First, the Court analyzed each step of the method 
claims to determine if the claims included more than the law of nature 
itself.63  The Court stated that a claim to a process that includes a law of 
nature is not patentable unless the claim has “additional features that 
provide practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort 
designed to monopolize the law of nature itself.”64  The Court focused 
on the need for additional elements in a claim beyond the law of nature 
and referenced the Flook Court’s viewpoint that a law of nature cannot 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1305. 
 58. Id. at 1296. 
 59. Id. at 1297. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1297–1302. 
 63. Id. at 1297–98. 
 64. Id. at 1297. 
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support a patent unless there is some other inventive concept.65 
Using the principle of inventive concept, the Court analyzed the three 
general process steps in the ‘623 Patent.  The ‘wherein’ step, which set 
forth the correlation between the blood concentrations of metabolite and 
the effectiveness of the drug, was the embodiment of the law of nature at 
issue.  Therefore, the Court analyzed the other two steps in the method 
claims to see if those steps added inventive concept independent of the 
law of nature.  The first step of administering the drug to a patient with 
an autoimmune disease worked to confine the invention to a particular 
class of patients.66  Relying on its decision in Bilski II, the Court held 
that this narrowing of the use of the correlation to a specific field of 
endeavor did not turn the claim into patent eligible subject matter.67  The 
Court held that the second step of determining the level of metabolites 
constituted pre-solution activity.68  Because methods of measuring the 
level of the metabolites in the patient were well-documented in the field 
of medicine, the Court classified the determination step as “well 
understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by 
scientists who work in the field,” which was not enough to make the 
claims patent eligible according to the Court’s prior decisions in Bilski II 
and Flook.69  Conventional or obvious pre- or post-solution activity is 
not sufficient to make a claim to a law of nature patent eligible.70  Last, 
the Court looked at all three steps as a whole and determined that the 
combination added nothing to the claims that did not exist in each of the 
three steps taken independently.71  The Court’s first approach, based on 
analyzing each step of the claim for an inventive concept separate from 
the law of nature itself, resulted in a finding of invalidity. 
In its second approach, the Court employed a guidepost analysis, in 
which the Court compared Mayo to its two prior decisions in Diehr and 
Flook, two decisions that resulted in opposing opinions.72  Diehr 
involved a rubber molding process that utilized a mathematical equation 
to calculate estimated residence times based on temperature 
measurements inside the mold.73  Because the process claim included 
the additional steps of adding rubber to the mold, closing the mold, 
measuring the mold temperature, comparing the calculated value against 
 
 65. Id. at 1297; see also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978). 
 66. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1298. 
 69. Id. at 1297–98. 
 70. Id. at 1298. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1298. 
 73. Id.  
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the actual elapsed time in the mold, and opening the mold when the 
elapsed time equaled the calculated time, the Court found the Diehr 
claims did not seek to preempt the use of the equation by others and, 
therefore, were patent eligible.74  Comparing Mayo to Diehr, the Court 
determined that the claims in the ‘623 Patent were weaker than the 
process claims in Diehr. 
In contrast, the claims in Flook included far fewer process steps and 
amounted to an attempt to patent a mathematical algorithm.75  The 
patent at issue in Flook involved a method for changing alarm limits in a 
process control system that consisted of continuously measuring the 
process variables, recalculating the alarm limits using a novel 
mathematical algorithm, and storing the new alarm limit value.76  The 
Flook Court determined that the process steps of measuring the process 
variables and storing the new alarm limit were well-known steps in the 
industry and that no inventive concept existed outside of the novel 
mathematical algorithm used to perform the calculation.77  Comparing 
Mayo to Flook, the Court found the ‘623 Patent claims to be no stronger 
than the claims found to be un-patentable in Flook.78  Based on this 
guidepost analysis, the Court found the ‘623 and ‘302 Patent claims to 
be at the Flook end of the Flook–Diehr eligibility spectrum and thus not 
patent eligible subject matter.79 
 In the third approach to patent eligible subject matter, the Court 
examined the scope of the claims and decided that the claims would pre-
empt any future use of the natural law.80  The Court began the analysis 
by reviewing additional prior decisions supporting the precedent “that 
simply appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of 
generality, to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas 
cannot make those laws, phenomena, and ideas patentable.”81  
Referencing Morse, the Court recounted the discussion of the Nielsen 
case, where an English court found a method for adding warm air to a 
furnace to be patent eligible because the method involved non-
conventional steps in addition to the natural law that adding warm air to 
a furnace improves efficiency.82  Moving to Bilski II, the Court 
reiterated its holding that narrowing the application of a natural law to a 
 
 74. Id. at 1298–99. 
 75. Id. at 1299. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1300–02. 
 81. Id. at 1300. 
 82. Id. 
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specific field of endeavor did not make the natural law patent eligible.83  
And finally, the Court referenced Gottschalk’s holding that without a 
practical application of the natural law the claims would be overbroad.84 
After reviewing these past precedents, the Court expressed the 
concern that the continued enforcement of the claims would prevent 
further use of the correlation in research.85  In Morse, the claims at issue 
foreclosed the use of electro-magnetism for any future innovation in the 
area of transmitting letters or characters over a distance, regardless of 
the devices invented.86  Similarly in Gottschalk, the claims precluded 
the use of the algorithm for converting of binary coded numbers to pure 
binary numbers in any future application.87  Likewise, the Court found 
that the general language employed by the ‘623 and ‘302 Patent claims 
would likely preclude the use of the correlation in any future medical 
research, even though the correlation is a narrow natural law applicable 
only to a specific treatment with a specific drug.88  The Court found that 
the claims would interfere with too much future use of the law of nature 
and that this confirmed its decision to find the claims patent ineligible.89  
After discussing the scope of the claims, the Court rebutted 
arguments made in favor of the patentability of the claims.90  Regarding 
the Federal Circuit’s application of the machine or transformation test, 
the Court stated that the test is only a clue and does not trump the 
judicial exception to patentability for laws of nature.91  In response to 
Prometheus’s argument that the natural law itself is narrow and specific, 
the Court responded that the scope of the natural law is irrelevant to the 
question of patentability.92  In its amicus brief, the government argued 
that any step added to a natural law should make the subject matter 
patentable, because if the added step is routine in the art, then the claims 
will fail the novelty and nonobvious requirements.93  The Court thought 
the government’s view would do away completely with the patentable 
subject matter inquiry altogether, which is inconsistent with past 
precedents.94  Last, Prometheus argued that invalidating the patent 
would have a chilling effect on research, because the patent incentive is 
 
 83. Id. at 1300–01. 
 84. Id. at 1301. 
 85. Id. at 1301–02. 
 86. Id. at 1301. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1302. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1302–05. 
 91. Id. at 1303. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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critical to continued funding of medical research.95  The Court 
responded by referencing opinions from the medical community in 
opposition to this position.96 
At the conclusion of the opinion, the Court addressed the scope of its 
ruling.  The Court stated that it hesitated to make any significant 
changes to the standard for determining patentable subject matter for 
fear that such a declaration may have unintended consequences in other 
fields of endeavor outside of medical methods.97  The Court recognized 
that Congress too has a role in clarifying any exceptions to the 
patentable subject matter requirement.98  In deciding Mayo, the Court 
set forth a fact-intensive, three-pronged approach for analyzing patent 
eligible subject matter but added very little substantive clarity to the 
uses of natural laws that are patent eligible. 
B. Response to the Mayo Decision 
In the months immediately following the Mayo decision, several 
lower courts found cause to interpret and apply the ruling in similar 
cases involving challenges to subject matter eligibility.  In Association 
for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO (Myriad II), the Federal 
Circuit upheld its initial decision that claims to an isolated DNA 
sequence and a method for screening potential cancer therapeutics were 
patent eligible subject matter, but the claim to a method for analyzing 
DNA sequences was not patent eligible.99  In doing so, the majority 
employed pieces and parts of the Mayo decision depending on the 
situation.  In regards to the claims to the isolated sequences of DNA, the 
majority opinion held that Mayo did not apply because a composition of 
matter was not a law of nature.100  The majority then used a guidepost-
type analysis, based on Chakrabarty101 and Funk Brothers,102 to show 
that the claims to isolated DNA sequences were indeed patentable 
 
 95. Id. at 1304. 
 96. Id. at 1304–05. 
 97. Id. at 1305. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
Following the Federal Circuit decision in Myriad I in July 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision and remanded the case to the Federal Circuit for 
reconsideration in light of the decision in Mayo.  Id. at 1308.  The case before remand is commonly 
referred to as Myriad I, and the case after remand, Myriad II. 
 100. Id. at 1331. 
 101. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (holding that a human engineered 
bacterium capable of consuming petroleum was patent eligible subject matter). 
 102. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1948) (holding that a 
mixed culture of bacteria for inoculating seeds was not patentable subject matter because the bacteria 
were unchanged from their natural state and, therefore, a phenomenon of nature). 
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subject matter.103  For the two method claims, the majority used a step-
by-step analysis similar to the first approach used by the Mayo Court, 
except the majority focused on whether the added steps were 
transformative under the machine or transformation test.104 
The concurring opinion in Myriad II disagreed with the majority that 
the Mayo decision applied strictly to method claims.  The two 
concurring judges felt that Mayo’s discussion of laws of nature “ought 
to apply equally to manifestations of nature.”105  Despite the difference 
of opinion on the scope of Mayo, the concurring judges agreed with the 
majority that the claims directed to isolated DNA sequences were 
patentable because the isolated sequences did not exist in exactly the 
same chemical or physical form in nature.106  The dissenting opinion in 
Myriad II argued that the claims to isolated DNA sequences were not 
patentable subject matter because the claims would preempt further 
efforts to isolate larger DNA sequences or whole DNA sequences.107  
Not only did the judges disagree on the applicable scope of the Mayo 
decision, but each of the three opinions used different parts of the Mayo 
opinion to make its arguments. 
On remand from the Federal Circuit, the District Court for the 
Northern District of Maryland, in Classen Immunotherapies, found 
patent eligible claims setting forth a method for choosing an 
immunization schedule for infants.108  The claims as issue in Classen 
were similar to the claims in Mayo except that the Classen claims 
required the added application step of selecting the appropriate 
immunization schedule.109  The court used the step-by-step method from 
Mayo to show that the additional application requirement was sufficient, 
without further evidence, to demonstrate that the patent claims 
constituted patentable subject matter.110  The Federal Circuit case that 
remanded Classen case back to the District Court is currently under 
consideration for certiorari on the issue of patent eligible subject matter 
under § 101.111 
In SmartGene, the District Court for the District of Columbia 
 
 103. Myriad II, 689 F.3d at 1326–31.  
 104. Id. at 1333–37. 
 105. Id. at 1340 (Moore, J., concurring). 
 106. Id. at 1340–41. 
 107. Id. at 1349 (Bryson, J., dissenting). 
 108. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, No. WDG-04-2607, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
112280, at *2–4 (N.D. Md. Aug. 9, 2012), on remand from, Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen 
IDEC, 659 F.3d 1037 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  The Federal Circuit case is currently under consideration for 
certiorari on the issue of patentable subject matter. 
 109. Id. at *17–19. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at *4–5. 
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followed the Mayo roadmap nearly verbatim in finding claims to a 
method of selecting a treatment regimen using a computer program to be 
non-patentable subject matter.112  Using the Mayo template as a guide, 
the district court first engaged in a guidepost analysis based on Diehr, 
Flook, Gottschalk, Bilski, and Mayo and then engaged in a step-by-step 
analysis of each claim.113  Unlike Mayo, the district court went a step 
further and added an analysis of the machine or transformation test to 
make sure that it left no stone unturned.114 
In response to the Mayo decision, the USPTO revised the Manual of 
Patent Examining Procedure to incorporate a three-prong inquiry to 
determine if a process or method involving the use of a natural law is 
patent eligible subject matter.115  The USPTO method first asks whether 
the claims set forth a process or method consisting of a series of steps.116  
The second inquiry asks whether the claim focuses on the use of a 
natural law.117  Further guiding the second inquiry, the USPTO reframes 
the question into whether or not the natural law is a limiting element of 
the claim.118  In other words, if the natural law imposes a limitation on 
the scope of the claims, then the claim may focus on the natural law.  An 
affirmative answer to the second inquiry prompts the examiner to 
proceed to the third inquiry, which asks if the claim introduces 
additional elements or steps to integrate the natural law into the 
invention.119  The additional elements must be sufficient to show that 
the invention is a practical application of the natural law.120 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The Mayo Court’s decision resulted in confusion about the scope of 
the decision and in varied application in the lower courts, which 
prompted an outcry from certain sectors of the medical research 
community.  The fuss is for the most part unwarranted, but the 
confusion is not.  The Court consolidated all of its prior precedents into 
an extensive three-approach method for determining patent eligible 
subject matter.  In doing so, the Court set forth a detailed roadmap for 
lower courts to follow in analyzing the specific facts of cases but 
 
 112. SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs, No. 08-00642, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44138 
(D.D.C. 2012). 
 113. Id. at *24–40. 
 114. Id. at *40–58. 
 115. MPEP § 2106.01 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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accomplished little to clarify the boundaries of patent eligible subject 
matter for methods involving laws of nature.  The discussion focuses 
first on the Court’s failure to add any substantial clarification to the law 
concerning patent eligibility of methods involving laws of nature.  Then, 
the discussion argues that evaluating the scope of the claims is superior 
to consideration of inventive concept and, finally, proposes legislative 
action to clarify the exception to patentable subject matter for laws of 
nature, abstract ideas, and mathematical formulas. 
A. Interpreting Mayo 
The Court’s opinion in Mayo assembled much of the Court’s prior 
precedent with respect to patent eligible subject matter for use of natural 
laws into a three-approach method, effectively rearranging its toolbox 
without adding any new tools.  The first approach relied on inventive 
concept, which first appeared with respect to subject matter eligibility of 
laws of nature in the Morse case and further developed in Flook and 
Bilski II.121  In the second approach, the Court compared the facts of 
Mayo against the facts of two guidepost cases, Flook and Diehr.  Courts 
have used this method since the founding of our legal system.  As part 
of its analysis in Morse, the Court compared the facts before it to the 
facts of a case from the English Court of Exchequer.122  In the third 
approach, the Court looked at the language of the patent claims and 
determined that the language was general enough to encompass all 
future processes making use of the correlation and, therefore, would 
negatively impact future research.123  To make that determination, the 
Court compared the facts before it against prior cases, namely Morse 
and Gottschalk.124  Each of the three approaches involved fact-intensive 
inquiries based on prior precedents and comparison to prior cases.  
Because of the Court’s reliance on precedent in its analysis, the Court 
added very little to the substantive applicability of the judicial exception 
for laws of nature. 
In fact, the Court may have actually taken a tool out of the toolbox, 
thereby perhaps reducing available precedent rather than creating 
precedent.  In addressing the Federal Circuit’s use of the machine or 
transformation Test, the Court stated that it had not “implied that the test 
trumps the ‘law of nature’ exclusion.”125  Although the Court indicated 
 
 121. See supra notes 33–36, 63–72. 
 122. See supra note 28. 
 123. See supra notes 89–90. 
 124. See supra notes 86–88. 
 125. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012). 
17
Wisecup: Mayo v. Prometheus: Reorganizing the Toolbox for Patent Eligible
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
1668 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
that the test may be a clue to patentability,126 it was careful not to 
incorporate any part of or reference to the test in its three approach 
method.  This exclusion of the machine or transformation test indicated 
disapproval of this method of determining the patent eligibility of uses 
of natural laws. 
In addition to the nature of the Court’s analysis, its own admissions 
testified to the lack of substantive change made to the law.  At the end of 
the opinion, the Court stated, “[the Court] must hesitate before departing 
from established general legal rules lest a new protective rule that seems 
to suit the needs of one field produce unforeseen results in another.”127  
Declining to make any new legal rules, the Court confined its opinion to 
the task of organizing and repackaging its prior precedents into a more 
usable method for making the patent eligible subject matter decision. 
Although the Court may have established a clear roadmap for 
undertaking the patent eligible subject matter analysis, the opinion does 
not add clarity to the boundary of subject matter eligibility for laws of 
nature.  Inventors and practitioners are still not able to distinguish 
between what is and is not permissible incorporation of a law of nature.  
The Court reiterated that some other inventive concept is necessary to 
make the use of a natural law patentable and emphasized that 
conventional pre- and post-solution activity does not make use of a 
natural law patentable.128  However, the Court did not provide any 
guidance on the nature of added method steps that would satisfy the 
inventive concept requirement.  The inventive concept standard 
continues to be a very malleable standard. 
The guidepost approach also added little clarity to defining the 
boundary of patentable subject matter.  In summarizing its guidepost 
discussion, the Court stated that the Mayo claims were “weaker than the 
(patent-eligible) claim in Diehr and no stronger than the (unpatentable) 
claim in Flook.”129  Presumably the opportunity for clarification exists 
between the two guideposts, since one was patent eligible and the other 
was not.  Yet because the Court said that the Mayo claims were “no 
stronger than” Flook, the case did not exist in the space between Diehr 
and Flook, and therefore did nothing to further clarify the boundary 
between patentable and not-patentable.  All Mayo provided was another 
set of facts to be an additional guidepost, but the location of that 
guidepost is almost indistinguishable from the Flook guidepost, which 
does nothing at all to resolve the boundary. 
The Mayo opinion will likely not have a major impact on the 
 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 1305. 
 128. See supra notes 35–36. 
 129. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1299. 
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patenting of medical methods.  Apart from the process set forth for 
examining the question of patent eligible subject matter, the opinion 
focused on the specific facts of Mayo.  Because of the fact intensive 
nature of the inquiry, the finding of invalidity was confined to the 
specific case before the court, and any precedential treatment should be 
limited to the process of analysis and Mayo’s position as a potential 
guidepost for future litigation. 
B. Consideration of the Scope of Claims is the Only Appropriate Method 
for Evaluation the Natural Law Exception to Patentability 
Of the three approaches that the Court set forth in Mayo, the scope of 
claims method is the only appropriate method for assessing the judicial 
exception to patent eligible subject matter for natural laws.  First, the 
step-by-step inventive concept method is not an appropriate method.  
The Court’s step-by-step analysis focused on identifying an inventive 
concept above and beyond the mere statement of the drug dosage 
correlation itself.  In doing so, the Court reiterated its prior holding that 
something more than well-known, routine, and conventional steps is 
required to show that the claims represent a practical application of the 
law of nature and not an attempt to patent the law of nature itself.130  
Some commentators have supported expansion of this inventive concept 
approach to patent eligible subject matter,131 but their support is 
misplaced. 
Analyzing the claims in search of an inventive concept beyond the 
statement of the law of nature is not the appropriate inquiry to determine 
whether an invention is patent eligible subject matter under § 101.  First, 
incorporating inventive concept into the subject matter eligibility 
determination is redundant when combined with the other requirements 
for patentability under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, the novelty and non-
obviousness requirements.132  The non-obviousness requirement in 35 
U.S.C. § 103 is itself the codification of a long-held judicial 
patentability exception based upon inventive concept.133  If the question 
 
 130. See supra notes 35–36. 
 131. Bernard Chao, Moderating Mayo, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 423 (2012) (advocating for 
strengthening the point of novelty (inventive concept) aspect of the Mayo decision). 
 132. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2006). 
 133. JANET M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 191–95 (Aspen Publishing, 3d ed., 2009) (The idea of 
“inventive concept” existed in the United States from the time of the first enactment of the patent law in 
1790.  The idea that some “inventive concept” was necessary to the question of patentability was a 
judicial exception to the existing requirements of novelty and utility that existed before1952.  In 1952, 
Congress codified this judicial exception into the obviousness requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103(a)); Graham v. John Deere, Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (quoting Thomas Jefferson in letter to Isaac 
McPherson (Aug. 1813)) (Thomas Jefferson found “difficulty in ‘drawing a line between the things 
which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not’”). 
19
Wisecup: Mayo v. Prometheus: Reorganizing the Toolbox for Patent Eligible
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
1670 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
of inventive concept is established up front in the patent eligible subject 
matter determination, then the patent system would have little reason for 
the non-obviousness requirement.  In responding to the government’s 
amicus brief in Mayo, the Court stated that § 102 and § 103 inquiries 
may overlap at times with the patentable subject matter inquiry, but that 
§ 102 and § 103 inquiries should not be used to make the patentable 
subject matter determination.  By introducing and advocating the use of 
“inventive concept,” the Court appeared to be doing just that—making 
obviousness, or inventive concept, the key to a subject matter 
determination by requiring that any steps added to a natural law 
represents a further non-obvious inventive step. 
Second, the inventive concept approach does not fulfill the law of 
nature exception’s purpose, which is to promote progress by preventing 
a patentee from monopolizing a law of nature and foreclosing the use of 
that law of nature for future scientific research or innovation.134  The 
approach asks if another inventive concept exists in the claims, but does 
not consider whether the scope of the claims forecloses the use of the 
law of nature in future development.  Therefore, the presence of an 
additional inventive concept might make a method or invention patent 
eligible subject matter under the standard, but the scope of the claims 
may also leave no non-infringing use of the law of nature.  In cases like 
Diehr, the inventive concept approach appears to work, because the 
Arrhenius equation is very broad in scope with nearly unlimited 
applicability, and patenting the use of the equation to calculate the 
residence time for a rubber injection molding process only carves out an 
insignificant sliver of the full scope of application of the natural law.  
For laws of nature that have a very small scope, such as the correlation 
between blood concentrations of metabolites and drug effectiveness, any 
incorporation into an invention forecloses a huge chunk of the potential 
future uses of the law of nature.  In this second example, use of the 
inventive concept approach would fail to preserve the use of the natural 
law for future innovation.  
Third, requiring an additional inventive concept is strikingly similar 
to narrowing the use of the law of nature to a specific field of endeavor, 
which the Court has held is not sufficient to make a law of nature patent 
eligible subject matter.135  Finally, the inventive concept approach does 
not provide a clear, unambiguous standard for the lower courts to apply.  
“Inventive concept” itself is an ambiguous term susceptible to various 
interpretations of just how much inventive concept is necessary to make 
the claims patent eligible subject matter.  The Bilski II Court held that 
 
 134. See supra notes 29–31. 
 135. See supra note 36. 
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well-known, routine, and conventional steps are insufficient to provide 
the necessary inventive concept.136  The other data point is Diehr, which 
involved a detailed rubber molding process, of which the law of nature 
was only a small part.137  The space in between is subject to near infinite 
interpretation. 
Moving on to the Court’s second approach, the guidepost analysis is 
insufficient to address patent eligible subject matter at this time.  The 
guidepost approach compared the facts of the case to data points 
generated from prior litigation.  This method can be effective if the 
guideposts clearly define the boundary between allowed and disallowed 
conduct, but in the case of the judicial exception to patent eligible 
subject matter, the space between any two guideposts is too large to 
provide notice of the uses of a natural law that are patentable.  In Mayo, 
the guideposts consisted of Flook and Diehr, which were too far apart to 
give any greater insight into the boundary between patentable and 
unpatentable.  Like the inventive concept approach, the guidepost 
approach also does not directly assess the preclusive effect of the claims 
and, therefore, does not address the underlying purpose of the judicial 
exception. 
The most appropriate approach to decide the patent eligibility of 
practical uses of natural laws is to analyze the scope of the patent claims 
at issue and determine whether the claims substantially foreclose the use 
of the law of nature in other applications. The Court in Gottschalk stated 
that natural laws are the building blocks of scientific research,138 and the 
Mayo Court suggested that patent protection of these laws of nature may 
actually impede innovation.139  Bearing in mind this initial purpose of 
the judicial exception, the proper standard for evaluating the patent 
eligible subject matter requirement should focus on the scope of the 
claims and the preclusive effect of that scope.  Any other inquiry would 
fail to satisfy the underlying purpose of the exception. 
  Like inventive concept, claim scope analysis also introduces 
ambiguity into the question of patent eligible subject matter for uses of 
laws of nature, but unlike inventive concept, which attempts to impose a 
clear rule based on the text of the claims, claim scope analysis is 
necessarily a case-by-case balancing of interests.  The key element of 
claim scope analysis is interpreting the scope of the claims, and lower 
courts should have sufficient experience in construing claims, because 
of the courts’ duty to decide issues of claim construction in patent 
 
 136. Bilski II, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010). 
 137. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177–84 (1981). 
 138. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
 139. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). 
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infringement cases.140  Courts can add objectivity and definiteness to the 
claim scope analysis by developing key factors such as the narrowness 
of the natural law, the existence and scope of non-infringing 
applications of the natural law, and the intent of the infringing party.141  
The Court is well-accustomed to performing such multi-factor balancing 
inquiries in the patent law field,142 which makes a scope of claims 
analysis easier to implement in the lower courts compared to inventive 
concept.  The Court might also ease the difficulty of claim scope 
analysis by shifting the burden to the patentee, upon a sufficient 
showing of ineligible subject matter by the defendant, to demonstrate 
substantial non-infringing uses of the natural law.   
Because a scope of claims analysis promotes the underlying purpose 
of the judicial exception for natural laws and the lower courts are 
accustomed to performing multi-factor balancing approaches in patent 
law, a scope of claims analysis is the most appropriate approach to 
deciding the question of patent eligible subject matter for inventions 
incorporating a law of nature. 
C. Patent Eligibility for Natural Laws is Ripe for Legislative Action 
Evaluating the scope of patent claims and determining whether or not 
the claims foreclose the use of a natural law in further innovation is 
often a judgment call that could have broad implications outside of the 
subject matter at issue.  One important consideration is whether or not 
allowing such claims would have an effect on the pace of innovation in 
the field of endeavor and how significant that effect would be.  This 
leads to public policy questions on the importance of research and 
development activities in several areas, such as computer science, 
genetics, and medical methods.   
Although the Court is often called upon to make such policy 
judgments, Congress is better suited to consider such public policy 
issues.  First, members of Congress are elected by popular vote and, 
therefore, are accountable to their constituents and political supporters, 
and because of this accountability, members of Congress are more in 
tune with the needs and desires of the public and better suited to 
 
 140. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 384–91 (1996). 
 141. In Mayo, the circumstances and facts giving rise to the case might suggest that Mayo 
intended to get around the patent rather than attempting to improve upon the correlation. 
 142. See Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (setting forth four factors for 
determining nonobvious under 35 USC § 103); see also In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350–51 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (establishing factors for determining whether a prior art reference is publicly 
accessible); see also, e.g., City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1878) 
(listing factors for determining if a public use qualifies for the experimental use exception to the 102(b) 
loss of patent right).  Federal courts have used multi-factor analysis for a very long time. 
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addressing questions of public policy.  In contrast, federal judges are 
appointed for life, which means they are not reliant on a constituency for 
re-election and not accountable to the public beyond a sense of duty.  
Beyond being accountable to the public, Congress has more resources 
with which to determine and evaluate public policy.  Congress possesses 
the exclusive power of appropriation, which is necessary to commission 
extensive investigation into public policy matters, and employs an 
extensive political process to expose potential legislative solutions to 
public comment and criticism.  Also, the process of legislation itself 
exposes a proposed solution to scrutiny and debate from various 
interests and public policies.  The Court, on the other hand, is limited to 
information contained in the record of the case and submitted by the 
parties and amici.  Though the justices may debate amongst themselves 
in chambers, this is a far cry from the public debate on the floor of the 
House of Representatives.  The Court in Mayo even recognized the role 
that Congress has in clarifying the law.143 
Congress also has experience in making changes to the patent system 
to codify judicial exceptions or adapt to changing public policies.  
Congress adopted the judicial exception to patentability for inventions 
lacking inventive concept by enacting the non-obvious standard in 35 
U.S.C. § 103 and implemented separate patent regimes for plant patents 
and design patents in response to changing public policies.  Congress 
has proven quite capable at addressing these changes in public policy by 
enacting appropriate legislation.  With the importance of health care 
innovation to the nation’s economy and the potential impact upon the 
patent system, the time has come for Congress to take a closer look at 
this issue.  
Concerning patent eligibility for laws of nature, Congress should start 
with a study addressing the potential impact on innovation.  Only with 
concrete data can our lawmakers make sound public policy decisions.  
Otherwise, Congress would be doing exactly what the Court is doing—
theorizing on potential arguments for and against patentability without 
any real information on the actual effects on research and development.  
Although comparative data may not be readily obtainable for the impact 
of the judicial exception on the rate of innovation in the medical method 
field, Congress’s other actions to implement specific programs for plant 
and design patents may offer some insight.  In addition, Congress should 
look to the impact of the 1952 codification of the non-obviousness 
requirement had on innovation.  Last, Congress can look at the impact of 
some recent judicial decisions in the patent field, for instance the KSR 
decision, which broadened the reach of the obviousness requirement, 
 
 143. See supra note 99. 
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making it more difficult to obtain a patent.144  Examining patent 
submissions and research and development expenditures following each 
of these events may be a starting point to find out the actual impact of 
changes to the patent law. 
Should a study find a substantial impact on the rate of innovation, 
Congress should avoid making a far-reaching and unpredictable change 
to the law by confining regulation to the field of medical methods, 
specifically.  Each field of endeavor poses unique challenges and, 
therefore, may not be adequately addressed by the same legislative 
actions.  For instance, the software and computer fields present patent 
eligible subject matter issues, but also involve a rate of innovation far 
faster than the rate of innovation of medical methods.  The nature of 
innovation is also vastly different based on the modular method of 
programming generally accepted by the software development industry.  
The Mayo Court expressed concern that a sweeping change in one area 
could have unforeseen consequences in other fields.145  Because of this, 
Congress may find prudence in addressing each field independently. 
As part of any regulatory system, Congress should begin by clearly 
defining terms, such as “law of nature,” “abstract idea,” and 
“mathematical algorithm.”  Second, Congress should enact legislation 
that requires an application step for medical method claims making use 
of a natural law or correlation.  This would provide the USPTO with 
some basis to differentiate between patents that attempt to preclude the 
use of a natural law and those that do not.  A goal of any regulatory 
patent system should be to promote the strength of the patents issued by 
the government. 
Third, Congress should address the preemptive scope of patent claims 
that involve natural laws by making claims foreclosing the use of natural 
laws unenforceable against future uses of the nature law in research and 
development or innovation activities.  Such a rule would allow patents 
involving natural laws to issue without overly intensive scrutiny, 
provided they first had an application step.  Because every invention 
must rely on some manifestation of a law of nature, patent claims may 
be difficult to draft without referencing or describing a natural law on 
which the claim is based.  Since preemptive scope is the foundation 
upon which the judicial exception was built, it makes sense to include 
this requirement in a regulatory scheme to codify the exception.  The 
result would be to confine the infringement question to the differences 
between the patent and the infringing use with respect to the steps 
beyond description of the natural law.  The effect would be to carve out 
 
 144. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007). 
 145. See supra note 98. 
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the natural law and compare what is left with the conventional tools of 
novelty and obviousness under § 102 and § 103.  This approach would 
prevent preemption of the natural law for future innovation, and at the 
same time, discourage potential infringers from attempting to 
circumvent a patent by making a trivial change to the method, like Mayo 
Collaborative Services did by merely changing the toxicity limit. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The medical methods industry waited, hopefully, for the opinion in 
Mayo to clarify the scope of patent eligible subject matter for medical 
methods based on natural laws.  Sadly, the Court merely reorganized its 
toolbox of prior precedent into an elaborate and fact intensive process 
for evaluating the patent eligible subject matter requirement for uses of 
natural laws, but did little to actually clarify the boundary between what 
is patentable and what is unpatentable.  The decision will likely have 
little effect on the future interpretation of the judicial exception for 
natural laws. 
Because of the important public policy issues that arise with the 
patentability of natural laws, Congress is better suited to the task of 
clarifying the law with respect to the use of natural laws in patent 
claims.  Although complete abrogation of any doubt over the boundaries 
of patentability is an impossible task, Congress, with a few small 
changes to the existing patent law system, can make a great 
improvement in the predictability of the patent law with respect to the 
use of natural laws.  After all, this is really what we all want: a standard 
to help us decide what discoveries we can and cannot protect. 
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